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Abstract 
Many OECD countries are increasingly relying on migrants to address shortages of 
trained health professionals. One key concern is whether migrant health professionals 
provide equivalent health care. We compare the treatment provided by migrant and 
non-migrant health professionals using administrative data from the Scottish dental 
system. A difference-in-differences model is estimated to examine whether migrant 
dentists respond differently to case mix and individual circumstances as compared 
with their non-migrant counterparts, and assess the extent to which any differences 
diminish over time. After controlling for both observed and unobserved differences 
between individual dentists and the cohort of patients that they treat, we find that 
migrant dentists have marginally different practice styles, and the variation diminishes 
over time within two years of practice. 
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Introduction 
To address the shortages of trained health care professionals, OECD countries have 
adopted a mix of long-term policies of national self-sufficiency (e.g. increasing 
domestic training, improving retention, and adapting skill mix), and short or medium-
term policies of international recruitment (OECD, 2008). Immigrant health 
professionals have proven to be a flexible and low-cost resource, and make a 
significant and escalating contribution to health care labour markets in industrialized 
countries. In 2000, there were approximately 400,000 migrant doctors and 710,000 
migrant nurses working in the OECD area. The United Kingdom, in particular, has 
become one of largest recipient countries, with 33% (69,813) of the doctors and 10% 
(65,000) of the nurses working in 2006 qualified overseas (WHO, 2006).  
There are important questions regarding the extent to which migrants are 
substitutes for domestically trained professionals, especially in the realm of health 
care, where in the presence of asymmetric information such professionals have 
considerable discretion over the type of care they deliver; this raises concerns 
regarding both the quality and safety of healthcare (OECD, 2008; Simoens and Hurst, 
2006).  Assessing the extent to which there are differences between internationally 
recruited and domestically trained health professionals is, therefore, clearly a concern 
for public policy. Until now, however, there has been little empirical work comparing 
the services delivered by migrant and indigenously trained health care professionals. 
The labour economics literature has long focused on examining the economic 
assimilation of migrant workers (see the survey in Borjas, 1994). Upon arrival in a 
host country that is experiencing a shortage of country-specific human capital, 
migrants tend to exhibit a large earnings deficit relative to native workers of similar 
ability (Chiswick, 1980). However, this earnings gap usually diminishes as migrants 
learn the local language and institutions, accumulate local experience, and adjust their 
skills to suit local conditions (Eckstein and Yoram, 2003). In general, these studies 
use earnings as a proxy for skills, with more rapid assimilation rates, i.e. faster 
earnings convergence, being found among higher skilled migrants (Friedberg, 2000a, 
b). More recently, researchers have investigated not only earnings, but also 
employment in terms of labour force participation and self-employment (see, for 
example, the survey in Dustamn and Fabbri, 2005). It has been argued that labour 
market participation is more important than earnings for migration assimilation in 
northern and western European countries which have less flexible labour markets 
coupled with generous welfare systems (Zorlu and Hartog, 2008).  
Whereas in conventional labour markets earnings and participation are natural 
measures of the extent to which migrant workers assimilate, for health care 
professionals a more relevant issue would seem to be the extent to which the care they 
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supply converges on that being provided by indigenously trained counterparts. In 
particular the questions we address are whether there are any differences in the 
observed intensity of treatment provided by migrant and non-migrant dentists in the 
Scottish NHS and whether any such differences diminish over time, and if so, at what 
rate. The rate of convergence is relevant because Wang (2010) highlights a high 
turnover of migrant dentists in the Scottish General Dental Service (GDS). While we 
may expect that the high degree of transferability of medical education within Europe 
could reduce the assimilation time of health professionals, it is not clear to what extent 
the country-specific skills and practice styles developed in original countries could be 
adjusted to fit with the new health care system within the short stay of this particular 
group of migrant dentists. 
To address these questions we use detailed administrative data from the 
Scottish National Health Service (NHS); these data enable us to measure the value of 
individual patient-level treatments carried out by individually identifiable but 
anonymous dentists and thus compare treatments carried out by migrant and non-
migrant dentists over time.  Our empirical method focuses on the extent to which any 
differences diminish over time.  
The paper is organised as follows. The next section describes some relevant 
features of the dentist labour market and dental service provision in the NHS Scotland. 
The penultimate section describes our data, sets out our empirical methodology and 
presents the results. The final section discusses the results and concludes the paper. 
Background 
The majority of NHS primary care dental services in Scotland are provided by 
General Dental Practitioners (GDPs) in the GDS. An individual requiring treatment 
under the NHS visits and registers with a GDP, who is under an agreement with the 
GDS to provide NHS treatments; they then receive treatment from that dentist. The 
costs of treatment are met in part by purchasing authorities, called NHS boards, which 
receive government funds in order to meet the dental and medical health care needs of 
their constituent populations. Unlike other health services supplied by the NHS there 
is a substantial element of patient cost sharing in dentistry. Unless exempt from 
charges, which can occur for a number of reasons, the patient pays 80% of the NHS 
fees for their treatment up to a cash limit.  
GDPs are predominantly self-employed and may work both privately and for 
the NHS. For NHS work a self-employed GDP‟s remuneration contract specifies both 
a fee for each treatment administered and a capitation payment for each patient 
registered. NHS Boards may choose to create salaried posts if access to the GDS is 
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limited. A salaried GDP does not receive remuneration proportional to the number or 
types of treatments they carry out
1
.
 
 
In order to practise dentistry in the GDS in Scotland, dentists need to obtain an 
NHS Board list number. To obtain a list number, dentists need to be issued with a 
Vocational Training (VT) number from NHS Education for Scotland to indicate that 
they have satisfactorily completed their Dental VT (DVT)
2
 in the UK or are exempt 
from the requirement to complete DVT because: 
 they are from an European Economic Area (EEA) Member State (other than 
the UK) and hold a recognised European Dental Diploma; 
 they have had a Health Board/Performer number within the last five years; 
 they have practised in primary dental care in the Community Dental Service or 
the Armed Forces for four years‟ full-time (or equivalent part-time), and for 
not less than four months during the past four years; 
 they have completed a course of vocational training under the voluntary 
scheme; or 
 their experience and or/training during the previous five years is equivalent to 
DVT. 
VT numbers are therefore a lead indicator of the inflow of dentists into the 
NHS in Scotland. Figure 1 shows that VT numbers issued have more than doubled 
during the past 9 years. As can also be seen, this increase is mainly contributed by the 
EEA nationals. There has been a large and sustained increase in VT numbers issued to 
EEA applicants, particularly in 2005-06. To put these numbers into some context, the 
number of funded undergraduate dental students entering dental schools in Scotland in 
2009-10 was 170. These EEA nationals comprise the migrant dentists in this paper. 
Figure 1. VT numbers issued from October 2000 to September 2009 
 
                                                 
1 Patients may also be treated in the NHS Community Dental Service (CDS) and the Hospital Dental Service 
(HDS). The role and remit of the CDS includes screening, health promotion and preventive programmes for 
children and adults with special needs and complements the GDS by identifying and managing the treatment of 
special needs groups. The HDS is a secondary care provider of dental services. 
 
2  Typically, DVT comprises 12 months of supervised clinical experience in an approved training practice 
supplemented by an educational programme. 
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The current policy framework for dental services in Scotland was set out in 
2005 by the then Scottish Executive in the Dental Action Plan (Scottish Executive, 
2005). This described a series of policy initiatives designed to “address our poor oral 
health record, provide better access for patients, and provide an attractive package for 
the professional staff who we wish to recruit to, and retain within, the NHS.”  
One of the policy initiatives launched by the Scottish Executive was to recruit 
about 35 dentists directly from Poland in 2006, to arrive in Scotland in three cohorts. 
These Polish dentists were employed on a three year contract with the salaried dental 
service after satisfactorily completing an intensive eight week English course and 
attending a two week residential course (NES, 2006). These recruited Polish dentists 
account for some but by no means all of the VT numbers issued to migrant dentists 
since 2005.  
Empirical framework 
Data 
The anonymised treatment data analysed in this paper come from the Management 
Information & Dental Accounting System (MIDAS), which is a large-scale 
administrative database of linked patient-practitioner information that stores all GDS 
treatment in Scotland. Within each course of treatment (CoT), the patient usually 
receives a range of items of service, each with an associated fee; fees are regularly 
reviewed by a statutory „arms-length‟ organisation, the Doctors‟ and Dentists‟ Review 
Body. The NHS payment system allocates a unique identifier for each patient, GDP, 
practice and CoT, making it possible to follow patients, GDPs and types of treatment 
over time.  
The sample of data on migrant and non-migrant dentists was acquired by using 
the GDC number of dentists issued with a VT number to identify their GDS treatment.  
For migrant dentists, the sample was restricted to include only GDPs who began 
providing GDS treatment after January 2006. For non-migrant dentists, the sample 
was restricted to GDPs who completed DVT in July 2006.  
The treatment data for both migrant and non-migrant dentists were restricted 
to information on the treatment of adults, because there is much more detailed 
information on the treatment of adults compared to children. The initial sample 
consisted of 199 migrant GDPs with 264,843 claims and 83 non-migrant GDPs with 
217,755 claims which were all paid prior to September 2008. There is an obvious link 
between the treatment required and how long it has been since that patient consulted a 
dentist. We thus use visit duration as a control and therefore are required to drop each 
patient‟s first treatment (for which we do not have the treatment duration); this 
restricts the sample to 116,211 claims made by 192 migrant GDPs and 112,394 claims 
made by 83 non-migrant GDPs. Finally, we focus on treatment provided during the 
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same experience period, i.e. the first 24 months after entry. This further reduces the 
sample size to 107,378 claims made by 192 migrant GDPs and 108,528 claims made 
by 83 non-migrant GDPs. 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for migrant and non-migrant GDPs. Our 
dependent variable is the (log of) the value of a claim, which is measured in £UK at 
constant SDR
3
107 prices. This monetary value gives a natural measure of the extent, 
or intensity, of treatment that a dentist provides to their patient. From the unadjusted 
mean, migrant dentists provide nearly 3% more treatment per patient.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
  Non-migrant Migrant 
Variable Description N Mean SD N Mean SD 
feesdr107 Total value of the claim (constant SDR107 prices) 108528 36.52 57.54 107378 38.35 56.53 
page The age of the patient 108528 45.25 14.51 107378 45.44 14.43 
psex The sex of the patient (male=1) 108528 0.44 0.50 107378 0.45 0.50 
exempt Exemption status (exempt=1) 108528 0.27 0.44 107378 0.29 0.46 
visitdur Duration since last visit (months) 108528 5.53 3.56 107378 5.76 4.04 
diag Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was a diagnosis item 108528 0.72 0.45 107378 0.70 0.46 
prev Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was a preventive item 108528 0.0006 0.0243 107378 0.0004 0.0193 
perio Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was a periodontal item 108528 0.49 0.50 107378 0.44 0.50 
cons Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was a conservative item 108528 0.36 0.48 107378 0.40 0.49 
surg Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was a surgical item 108528 0.07 0.25 107378 0.08 0.28 
prosth Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was a prosthetic item 108528 0.06 0.23 107378 0.07 0.25 
ortho Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was an orthodontic item 108528 0.0000 0.0053 107378 0.0001 0.0114 
other Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was an „other‟ item 108528 0.06 0.24 107378 0.07 0.26 
occasional Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was an occasional item 108528 0.01 0.07 107378 0.01 0.11 
incomplete Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was an „incomplete‟ item 108528 0.005 0.068 107378 0.010 0.101 
misc Equals 1 if at least one treatment on the claim was a „miscellaneous‟ item 108528 0.20 0.40 107378 0.22 0.42 
trauma Equals 1 if at the claim was characterized by trauma 108528 0.0012 0.0345 107378 0.0010 0.0314 
enterage The age of the dentist at the first treatment in the GDS 83 25.29 2.26 192 34.36 8.83 
dsex The sex of the dentist (male=1) 83 0.49 0.50 192 0.48 0.50 
sal Remuneration structure (salaried=1) 83 0.02 0.15 192 0.19 0.40 
Exp_0-6 Equals 1 if less than 6 months elapsed since the first treatment 108528 0.09 0.29 107378 0.21 0.40 
Exp_7-12 Equals 1 if 7-12 months elapsed since the first treatment 108528 0.28 0.45 107378 0.31 0.46 
Exp_13-18 Equals 1 if 13-18 months elapsed since the first treatment 108528 0.32 0.47 107378 0.27 0.44 
Exp_19-24 Equals 1 if 19-24 months elapsed since the first treatment 108528 0.31 0.46 107378 0.21 0.41 
 
It can be seen that patients treated by the two groups of GDPs are very similar 
in terms of their age, gender, exemption status and duration since last visit.  
The type of treatment provided to these patients is also very similar but there 
are some small differences in the proportion of CoTs in which diagnostic 
(examinations and x-rays), periodontal (scaling and polishing), and conservative 
(fillings) treatment were provided.  
                                                 
3 The Statement of Dental Remuneration (SDR) is an annual publication which sets out the complete menu of 
capitation (continuing care) payments and item of service payments. 
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The average age at entry of the migrant GDPs was 34, nine years older than 
the non-migrants. Non-migrant GDPs were more likely to be non-salaried than 
migrant GDPs, perhaps as a result of the Scottish Executive‟s recruitment initiative. 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of CoTs by deprivation category of the practice (a 
seven point scale in which 1 indicates least deprived, and 7 indicates most deprived) 
and which we interpret as proxy for the average deprivation of that practice‟s patients, 
and indicates that migrant GDPs work in areas of greater deprivation than non-
migrants.  
 
Figure 2. Distribution of CoTs by deprivation category of the practice 
 
 
Within the sample period migrant GDPs provide more treatment (by value) per 
CoT compared to non-migrants (£38.22 vs. £36.55). However, following Friedberg 
(2000), Figure 3 shows how the mean value of treatment per CoT changes during the 
sample period. It suggests that while there is some difference between migrant and 
non-migrant GDPs initially, there is convergence in the mean value per CoT from the 
fifth quarter after entry onwards.  
Figure 3. Treatment value for migrant and non-migrant GDPs over time 
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Figure 3 also indicates that both groups of GDPs exhibit an initial period 
during which mean of the value per CoT increases, a feature that is probably the result 
of the claims process: during the first few months only short and therefore relatively 
low value CoTs will be processed. Thus, we focus on the treatment provided after the 
second month after entry. This reduces the sample size to 103,412 claims made by 
179 migrant GDPs and 107,668 claims made by 82 non-migrant GDPs. 
 
Regression methods 
The traditional Labour Economics literature has highlighted a speedy assimilation 
process by general migrant workers as they learn the local language and institutions, 
accumulate local experience, and adjust skills to suit local labour markets (Eckstein 
and Yoram, 2003). Figure 3 suggests that apart from some initial discrepancy there is 
convergence by migrant GDPs to their non-migrant counterparts in terms of treatment 
intensity. In order to more rigorously test for this pattern, whilst controlling for both 
observed and unobserved differences between individual dentists and the cohort of 
patients that they treat, we estimate the following individual-effects, difference-in-
differences (DiD) model: 
                         ∑          ∑                           
where     is the value of the kth CoT provided by dentist i;   is a dummy variable 
indicating a migrant GDP;     denotes a set of controls such as patient characteristics 
and the broad treatment categories reported in Table 1 that vary across dentists and 
CoTs;       is a vector of binary variables indicating dentist experience by every six 
months elapsed since the first treatment (   the reference category is the 2nd month 
after entry);    are dentist-specific effects capturing unobserved heterogeneity 
between dentists; and     is a pure random error orthogonal to all explanatory 
variables. The fixed effects estimation method is preferred to allow for arbitrary 
correlation between unobservable effects and observed explanatory variables.  This, 
however, means that the coefficient on M cannot be estimated directly since a 
dentist‟s migrant status is fixed over time.  Our analysis therefore focuses on the 
interactions between migrant status and other observable features of treatments (these 
interactions are set out in columns three and four in Table 2).  
The coefficients on the interactions between the migrant dummy and treatment 
category indicators, prev*m, perio*m, ..., misc*m, capture differences in the practise 
styles of migrant and non-migrant GDPs. The coefficient on the interactions between 
the migrant dummy and experience category variable, Exp_g*m, captures the rate that 
migrant GDPs adjust treatment intensity over time, relative to the non-migrant GDPs, 
whilst allowing for their initial difference at the reference experience category. 
Henceforth, we use the term assimilation rate as the rate of reduction in treatment 
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difference between migrant and non-migrant GDPs. We can calculate the assimilation 
rate during the period from    to    (month 3-6         month 19-24) as 
 (  |  )          . A quicker assimilation rate implies that treatments between 
migrant and non-migrants converge faster, and vice versa. 
 
Regression results  
Table 2 presents the results of estimating equation (1) in a dentist fixed effects model
4
. 
Dentist effects estimated in the fixed effects specification are significantly different 
from zero (F(260, 210745)=11.93, Prob>F=0.0000) and account for approximately 58% 
of the variation in treatment value (ρ=0.58). An F-test that all regressors are jointly 
equal to zero is rejected (F(74,210745)=4461.27, Prob>F=0.0000). Standard errors are 
corrected for both heteroskedasticity across dentists and within-dentist correlation 
using robust cluster variance estimation. 
     
Table 2. Regression results 
Assimilation estimates (ref. group: Exp_2) 
 
Exp_3-6 -0.0092 Exp_3-6*m 0.0389 
 
[0.0307] 
 
[0.0350] 
Exp_7-12 0.003 Exp_7-12*m 0.0484 
 
[0.0297] 
 
[0.0339] 
Exp_13-18 0.0115 Exp_13-18*m 0.0318 
 
[0.0298] 
 
[0.0349] 
Exp_19-24 0.0186 Exp_19-24*m 0.0052 
 
[0.0303] 
 
[0.0360] 
Treatment categories 
  
Prev 0.7394* prev*m 0.0319 
 
[0.1318] 
 
[0.2011] 
Perio 0.6885* perio*m -0.0061 
 
[0.0130] 
 
[0.0177] 
Cons 1.1777* cons *m -0.0104 
 
[0.0191] 
 
[0.0262] 
Surg 0.6270* surg*m 0.0344 
 
[0.0157] 
 
[0.0215] 
Prosth 1.4709* prosth*m 0.1122* 
 
[0.0262] 
 
[0.0372] 
Ortho 1.1839 ortho*m 0.8166 
 
[0.8176] 
 
[0.9958] 
Other 0.0557+ other*m -0.0261 
 
[0.0283] 
 
[0.0373] 
Occasional 0.6180* occasional*m -0.0792 
 
[0.0494] 
 
[0.0643] 
                                                 
4 A Hausman test rejected the random effects specification. 
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Table 2. Regression results (continued) 
Incomplete 0.6061* incomplete *m -0.1448 
 
[0.0854] 
 
[0.0970] 
Misc -0.0225 misc*m 0.0034 
 
[0.0196] 
 
[0.0254] 
Trauma 0.1122 trauma*m 0.0639 
 
[0.0680] 
 
[0.0944] 
Remuneration 
   
Sal Yes sal*m Yes 
Exempt 0.0896* exempt*m 0.0206 
 
[0.0163] 
 
[0.0211] 
Patient characteristics 
  
Page 0.0031* page*m -0.0016 
 
[0.0011] 
 
[0.0016] 
page^2/100 -0.0048* page^2/100*m 0.0021 
 
[0.0010] 
 
[0.0016] 
Psex 0.0137* psex*m 0.0111* 
 
[0.0041] 
 
[0.0055] 
Visitdur 0.0395* visitdur*m -0.0015 
 
[0.0033] 
 
[0.0039] 
visitdur^2/100 -0.1459* visitdur^2/100*m 0.0066 
 
[0.0171] 
 
[0.0202] 
Practice deprivation (ref. group: depcat4) 
Depcat Yes depcat*m Yes 
Health board (ref. group: caid5) 
 
Caid Yes caid*m Yes 
_cons 1.6189* 
  
 
[0.1111] 
  
F 4461.27 N 211080 
r2 0.61 N_g 261 
r2_a 0.61 g_avg 808.74 
r2_o 0.32 sigma_u 0.67 
r2_w 0.61 sigma_e 0.56 
r2_b 0.08 rho 0.58 
                For confidentiality reasons, we do not report coefficients on binary variables and 
responding interaction variables that are identified with small number of dentists, 
such as dentist contract (sal, sal*m), practice deprivation (depcat, depcat*m) and 
NHS Health Board (caid, caid*m).  
                Standard errors are in square brackets. 
  * significant at the 5% level. 
  + significant at the 10% level. 
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An hypothesis test that the coefficients on the interactions between migrant 
status and the treatment category indicators are jointly equal to zero is not rejected at 
the 5%  significance level (P=0.058). In terms of individual coefficients, the only 
significant difference between the treatment intensity of migrant and non-migrant 
dentists is for the prosthetic treatment: migrant GDPs provide significantly more 
treatment for patients who require for prosthetic treatment (11.22% P=0.003) 
compared with non-migrant GDPs. 
Dummy variables for a dentist‟s contract (salaried or not) and each patient‟s 
exemption status capture how dentists respond to remuneration structure and demand-
side cost-sharing, respectively. Coefficients on dentist contract and its interaction are 
based upon the 2 (or 0.8% of the sample) GDPs who switched contracts during the 
sample period and therefore, are not reported for confidentiality reasons. While non-
migrant GDPs provide exempt patients with 8.96% more treatment than non-exempt 
patients (P<0.001), the interaction term shows that there is no significant difference 
between migrant and non-migrant dentists in the way they treat exempt and non-
exempt patients.  
As to the standard patient controls, only the interaction term on the patient‟s 
sex is significantly different from zero. This suggests that, relative to female patients, 
male patients receive significantly more treatment from migrant GDPs than from non-
migrant GDPs (1.11%, P=0.044).  
While the individual coefficients are not reported in Table 2, F-tests suggest 
that migrant GDPs provide significantly different treatment relative to non-migrants 
according to the deprivation category and (separately) NHS board in which they 
practise.  
Migrant and non-migrant GDPs follow significantly different time patterns of 
treatment value. An F-test that the interaction terms are jointly equal to zero is 
rejected (P<0.001). Figure 4 plots treatment experience profiles for both migrant and 
non-migrant dentists using the coefficients on the experience variables. This shows 
that the treatment difference between migrant and comparable non-migrant GDPs, 
which is initially substantial, diminishes over time and is largely eliminated within 
two years of practice in the GDS. During the first two six months of practice, 
treatment value increases in both groups, which is likely to be a result of the claim 
process. It is therefore useful to begin a comparison at month nine. At this point 
migrant GDPs provide 4.84% more treatment by value than their non-migrant 
counterparts; this gap reduces to 3.18% over the following six months, and then 
approaches zero.  
Table 3 presents predicted assimilation rates over time. It suggests that, after 
adjusting for observed heterogeneity across CoTs and dentist fixed effects, there is 
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significant convergence of migrant GDPs to comparable non-migrants from the 7
th
 to 
the 24
th
 month since entry: the difference of treatment value reduces significantly by 
4.32% (P=0.002, 95% confident interval is [-6.97%, -1.67%]). 
 
Figure 4. Predicted treatment experience profiles for migrant and non-migrant GDPs 
 
 
Table 3. Predicted assimilation rates 
  Coef. Std. Err. P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
Exp_7-12 - Exp_3-6 0.0095 0.0154 0.540 [-0.0209, 0.0398] 
Exp_13-18 - Exp_7-12 -0.0166 0.0114 0.145 [-0.0390, 0.0058] 
Exp_19-24 - Exp_13-18 -0.0266 0.0082 0.001 [-0.0428, -0.0104] 
Exp_19-24 - Exp_7-12 -0.0432 0.0135 0.002 [-0.0697, -0.0167] 
 
As a robustness check, Table 4 presents assimilation estimates across different 
specifications. Specification 1 re-estimates our baseline model reported in Table 2, 
where we set the second 6 months after entry (Exp_7-12) as the reference group. The 
assimilation rate during the period from the 7
th
 to the 24
th
 month can therefore, be 
directly captured by       . Specification 2 replicates specification 1 but focuses only 
on what might be termed active treatments, i.e. those which contain items of service 
over and above a routine examination, or a scale & polish, or both (Chalkley and 
Tilley, 2006). Active treatments constitute 65% of the sample. Specification 3 is the 
same as Specification 1, but excludes the variable, visitdur, so that information on 
patients‟ first treatments can also be used. Comparing the main coefficients of interest, 
Exp_19-24*m, across specifications 1-3 suggests that estimates of the assimilation 
process is very similar irrespective of the precise specification. During the period 
from the 7
th
 to the 24
th
 month after entry, the treatment difference between migrant 
and non-migrant GDPs reduces by an even larger magnitude for the total treatments 
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(5.56%) and subsequent active treatments (5.38%) as compared with subsequent 
treatments (4.33%). All these estimates are found to be statistically significant. 
 
   Table 4. Assimilation estimates across specifications 
 
1 
Baseline 
 
2 
Excl. 
inactive 
3 
Excl. 
visitdur 
4 
Incl. 
ln(l.feesdr107) 
5 
Multi 
level 
(Ref. group: Exp_7-12) 
Exp_2-6*m -0.0136 -0.0189 -0.0174+ 0.0036 0.0028 
 
[0.0148] [0.0184] [0.0102] [0.0156] [0.0201] 
Exp_13-18*m -0.0168 -0.0198 -0.0272* -0.0155 -0.0238+ 
 
[0.0114] [0.0160] [0.0113] [0.0117] [0.0121] 
Exp_19-24*m -0.0433* -0.0538* -0.0556* -0.0374* -0.0413* 
 
[0.0135] [0.0195] [0.0152] [0.0140] [0.0136] 
Robust standard errors clustered by dentists for Specification 1-4, and clustered by patients 
for Specification 5. 
    Standard errors are in square brackets. 
     * significant at the 5% level. 
     + significant at the 10% level. 
 
Specification 4 includes the natural logarithm of the value of the treatment 
patients received at their last visit, ln(l.feesdr107), instead of visitdur, to account for the 
potential endogeneity, which occurs if unobserved factors that influence dentists‟ 
decisions on how often to treat patients may also influence their decisions on how 
much to treat. We find that there is little qualitative change in the assimilation 
estimates compared with the baseline specification. A possible explanation is that 
patients‟ visit duration for dental services is a patient-led or demand-side decision. 
Finally, Specification 5 estimates a multilevel fixed effects model 
simultaneously controlling for patient- and dentist-specific effects. The three-way 
error-component model is estimated using the “FEiLSDVj” approach discussed by 
Andrews et al. (2006)
5
. Although the multilevel model may not be very well identified 
given the small proportion of patients switching between dentists during the two-year 
sample period, the assimilation estimates suggest a consistent assimilation process as 
compared with other specifications.  
Discussion and conclusion 
As a flexible and low-cost adjustment to temporary or regional imbalance, overseas 
qualified health professionals have made a significant and escalating contribution to 
                                                 
5  The estimation is implemented using a memory saving Stata module “felsdvreg” written by Cornelißen 
Cornelißen T. 2006. Using Stata for a Memory Saving Fixed Effects Estimation for the Three-way Error 
Component Model. (Ed)^(Eds), FDZ Methodenreport Institute for Employment Research: Germany; 2006.. 
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the health workforce in industrialized countries. This paper, for the first time to our 
knowledge, evaluates the impact of international recruitment on the healthcare 
provision in the host country by comparing the treatment provided by migrant and 
non-migrant health professionals, specifically dentists in the NHS in Scotland.  
The treatment provided by all migrant dentists who started providing dental 
services in the GDS after 2006 are compared with the treatment provided by a group 
consisting of domestically trained dentists who recently finished DVT and 
subsequently worked in the GDS. We choose a particular cohort of GDPs for 
comparison rather than a representative sample of the overall GDPs because it is more 
policy relevant to compare the outputs of the migrant GDPs with the outputs of 
domestically trained dentists who entered the service at the same time.  
We estimate a difference-in-differences model to examine whether the 
treatment provided by migrant and non-migrant dentists differ and converge during 
the sample period. Our results suggest that migrant GDPs have marginally different 
practice styles: compared with non-migrant dentists with comparable characteristics, 
migrant dentists provide significantly different amounts of treatment but only for 
patients who require prosthetic treatment and for male patients. We also find that the 
difference in the amount of treatment provided by migrant and non-migrant dentists 
diminishes with time spent in the GDS. Thus for this particular group of health 
professionals, migrant and non-migrants do not offer the precisely the same treatment, 
but differences diminish over time.  
Dentists have considerable discretion over the type of service they deliver, and 
therefore, differences in treatment that are not the result of any observable 
characteristic of patients naturally give rise to concerns that dentists are exercising 
their discretion in a way that may be detrimental to patients, or that, in the case of 
migrant dentists, dentists are not familiar with the health needs of indigenous patients 
or preferred practice methods.  Thus the evidence reported in this paper may give 
some comfort to patients and policy-makers alike. 
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